Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding and for Abstention Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Debtor-Plaintiff sought damages against Defendant for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and fraudulent or deceptive trade practices. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that abstention was mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) or alternatively, the Court should permissively abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). The Court found that Defendant’s motion was timely; that the adversary proceeding was on upon state law claims; that the case was merely “related to” a bankruptcy case, rather than arising in or under Title 11; that there would be no independent grounds for federal jurisdiction over these claims; that the state court action based on the claims was pending when the bankruptcy case was filed; and that the claims could be timely adjudicated in state court. Therefore, abstention was mandatory. The Court further found that, even if abstention were not necessary, it would permissively abstain in the interests of justice and comity.
Opinions
The NCMB offers a database of opinions for the years 2000 onward, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
(Judge: Benjamin A. Kahn)
(Judge: Benjamin A. Kahn)
Order Determining That Modern Rent to Own Violated the Automatic Stay and Awarding Damages Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(K). The Court ordered sanctions against a Creditor for violating the automatic stay, and granted nominal damages of $1 and punitive damages of $5,000 to Debtor. Pro se Debtor had filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and listed certain lease-purchase agreements between herself and Creditor. The Bankruptcy Noticing Center served a notice on Creditor on September 5, 2025. Shortly thereafter, Debtor began receiving three to five phone calls per day, as well as text messages, from Creditor. These messages attempted to recover on Debtor’s prepetition debt, or repossess the personal property which secured it. Debtor missed opportunities to work as a result of her full voicemail. On October 31, Debtor explained to Creditor’s representative that she had filed bankruptcy, but the representative responded that he was instructed to continuously call anyone whose account was not current, regardless of a bankruptcy filing. As directed by the representative, Debtor emailed and called the Creditor to inform them of her bankruptcy proceeding. The manager of the store likewise indicated that he had received notice of the proceeding, but had been told the stay did not apply. The Court found that this behavior constituted a willful violation of the automatic stay, as Creditor had knowledge of the bankruptcy. Furthermore, the Court found this behavior justified damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). Debtor alleged injuries from the violation of the automatic stay, such as costs to file and serve the motion, missed work opportunities, and mental anguish; however, she failed to introduce evidence sufficient to quantify compensatory damages. As a result, the Court awarded $1 in nominal damages. The Court also awarded punitive damages because Creditor acted in reckless disregard of the stay, about which it had been notified multiple times. Further, Creditor’s constant phone calls and texts harassed Debtor. In determining the amount of punitive damages, the Court did not use the nominal damages as a guidepost because they were not representative of Debtor’s actual damages nor sufficient to deter Creditor and others. Instead, the Court determined a moderate damage award was necessary and reached $5,000 by doubling the amount that Debtor owed on the underlying contractual obligations.
(Judge: Benjamin A. Kahn)
Order on Document Titled “Defendants’ Clarification Regarding Conditional Withdrawal.” Plaintiffs seek a declaration of exception to discharge for a debt owed to Plaintiff by Defendants. Pro se Defendants filed an answer, an amended answer, adding counterclaims and a third-party complaint. Then, Defendants filed a document titled “Defendants Amended Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim” which the Court liberally construed as (1) a motion for leave to amend Defendants’ amended answer, (2) a voluntary dismissal of the third-party complaint, and (3) a motion to reconsider the Court’s prior order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss as well as the Court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to reconsider.. The Court allowed Defendants seven days to file a statement explaining how the Court had misinterpreted the filing. Thereafter, Defendants filed the document titled “Defendants’ Clarification Regarding Conditional Withdrawal.” Defendants stated that the prior document was intended to withdraw all previously asserted third-party claims and counterclaims, and to add a new counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff does not hold a cognizable debt. Therefore, the Court construed the prior document as (1) a motion for leave to amend the amended answer to withdraw previously asserted counterclaims and to add the declaratory judgment counterclaim, and (2) a notice of voluntary dismissal of third-party complaint. The Court granted Defendants leave to withdraw the previously asserted counterclaims. The Court denied Defendants leave to add the declaratory judgment counterclaim because the proposed amendment failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and was therefore futile. Plaintiff’s right to payment constitutes a claim under § 101(5)(A) and Defendants’ liability under that claim constitutes a debt under § 101(12); therefore, Plaintiff holds a cognizable debt.
(Judge: Benjamin A. Kahn)
Order on Motion for Determination that Automatic Stay Does Not Apply or, Alternatively, Relief from the Automatic Stay. The Court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3613, overrides the bankruptcy code to the extent that a restitution debtor holds rights to property otherwise subject to the automatic stay. Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 bankruptcy case, listing among her assets real property subject to three liens. One lien arose from a restitution judgment, subject to the MVRA, against Debtor’s ex-spouse, as a result of the ex-spouse having been found guilty of wire fraud. At the time the judgment was entered, Debtor and the ex-spouse owned the subject real property as tenants by the entireties. Upon entry of the judgment, the properly perfected lien attached to all of the ex-spouse’s property, including his undivided one-half ownership interest in the real property at issue. Subsequently, and prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy, the United States ( Creditor) initiated a civil action to enforce the lien against the ex-husband’s undivided one-half ownership interest in the real property in the middle district of North Carolina. Creditor sought a forced judicial sale and named Debtor as one of the defendants. Thereafter, Debtor filed for bankruptcy. Creditor requested a determination that the automatic stay does not apply to the Civil Action because the MVRA overrides the Bankruptcy Code. In the alternative, Creditor requested relief from the automatic stay. The Court determined that the automatic stay does not apply to the Civil Action. First, the Court noted that it had previously held that the MVRA allows for seizure of all property or rights to property notwithstanding any other federal law, also applies to and supersedes the Bankruptcy Code, including the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). A restitution lien is valid against all co-owners, even if owned as tenants by the entireties, as here. While Debtor was not the defendant ordered to pay restitution, and although she had since become the sole owner of the property, the restitution lien nevertheless survived ex-spouse’s transfer of his interest in the property to her. The Court further noted that if such a transfer did permit a criminal defendant to evade the MVRA by simply transferring the affected property to a spouse after the property became subject to the restitution lien such a rule would also would eviscerate the statute’s effect. Therefore, the stay did not apply to the continuation, enforcement, and collection of the restitution against the real property in the civil action.
(Judge: Benjamin A. Kahn)
Order on Document Titled “Motion To Address Potential Counsel Conflicts and To Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution.” In nondischargeability action, pro se Defendants filed counterclaims, and a third-party complaint against additional named individuals, including Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff and third-party defendants moved for a protective order and sanctions against Defendants. Defendants then filed a document titled “Motion To Address Potential Counsel Conflicts and To Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution” which the Court liberally construed as a motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel and stay further proceedings on the motion for protective order as well as the motion for sanctions. The Court denied all relief requested by Defendants. The Court found that since Defendants are not current or former clients of Plaintiff’s counsel, they cannot disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel under N.C. R. Prof. C. 1.7. Additionally, Defendants could not disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel under N.C. R. Prof. C. 3.7, which provides that a lawyer generally cannot act as an advocate at a trial in which she is likely to be a necessary witness, because Defendants’ statements were conclusory and insufficient to show Plaintiff’s counsel would be necessary witnesses.
(Judge: Benjamin A. Kahn)
Order on Document Titled “Defendants Amended Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim.” Plaintiff seeks a declaration of exception to discharge for a debt owed to Plaintiff by Defendants under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Defendants, proceeding pro se, filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss , which the Court denied. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and the Court denied the motion. Subsequently, Defendants filed an answer, an amended answer adding counterclaims, and a third-party complaint. Thereafter, Defendants filed a document titled “Defendants Amended Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim.” In it, Defendants asked the Court to determine whether Plaintiff holds a cognizable debt for nondischargeability purposes and stated they did not assert any claims for damages, requests for sanctions, or claims against third parties. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A), a party may voluntarily dismiss a pleading, including third-party complaints, by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Because the third-party defendants had not filed an answer or moved for summary judgment, the Court construed the filing as a voluntarily dismissal of the third-party complaint. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a party may amend a pleading for a second time only with the consent of the opposing party or the court’s leave. Therefore, the Court liberally construed the document as a request for leave to amend Defendants’ amended answer to voluntarily dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims. Finally, because the Court had previously determined that Plaintiffs had stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court liberally construed the request for a determination of whether Plaintiff held a cognizable debt as a motion to reconsider the Court’s prior order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss as well as the Court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to reconsider. The Court allowed Defendants seven days to file a statement explaining how the Court had misinterpreted the filing. The Court stayed any time within which Plaintiff and third-party defendants must respond to the motion for leave to amend and the motion to reconsider, or to respond to the counterclaims and third-party complaint pending further order of the Court.