The Court considered cross motions for summary judgment from the Plaintiffs, City of Winston-Salem and Forsyth County, and the Defendant, Northwest Child Development Centers, Inc. The dispute prompting the adversary proceeding involved the Defendant’s use of real property conveyed to it by the Plaintiffs for a certain use, i.e., for “not-for-profit child day care and related purposes.” The property’s deed included this use restriction and provided the Plaintiffs the opportunity to reclaim the property in the event of a non-conforming use. The Plaintiffs filed the adversary proceeding after the Defendant ceased operation of its daycare facility at that location and limited its use of the property to storage of childcare equipment and technology.
     The Court considered the range of permissible uses granted in the deed and whether storage of childcare equipment and technology was included in the definition of “not-for-profit child day care and related purposes.” With guidance from North Carolina caselaw and through application of traditional tools of interpretation, the Court determined the use restriction to be unambiguous and that the Defendant’s use of the property for storage was not within the scope of “related purposes.” The Defendant’s use of the property as a storage location for its sole remaining childcare facility, which was located in a different county, was at best a tangential or incidental connection to “not-for-profit child day care” and was not a sufficiently “related purpose” to satisfy the deed’s use restriction.
     Moreover, even if the phrase “related purposes” was ambiguous and the circumstances surrounding the transaction favored the Defendant’s view of the parties’ intention, the Court could not adopt a construction that places the parties’ intention in direct conflict with a fixed rule of law, specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-279(a), which required that the Plaintiffs attach conditions to the deed to assure the property was used for a public purpose. Because use of the property for storage was not a public use for purposes of § 160A-279(a), the Court could not adopt the Defendant’s interpretation of the use restriction.
     Accordingly, the Court found there were no material facts in dispute and the Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.