Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss.  Defendant doctor filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff-Trustee’s amended complaint, in which the Trustee sought to avoid and recover a $12.5 million transfer used to purchase the Defendant’s medical practice as an actually fraudulent transfer under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(a)(1) and the Trustee’s strong-arm powers of 11 U.S.C. § 544.                  
     The Court granted the motion to dismiss the Trustee’s second cause of action finding that the Trustee failed to sufficiently allege that insurance policyholders qualified as "triggering creditors" under section 544(b). The Court observed that, given the attenuated and unclear nature of any claim a policyholder might have that would lead to a claim against the Debtor under North Carolina law, and the complexity of the transfers providing the basis for any such claim, the lack of basic factual assertions in the Amended Complaint supporting the existence of a policyholder-creditor left the issue at the speculative level rather than crossing into the plausible.
     The Court, however, denied the motion as to the first and third causes of action. Per the Trustee’s allegations, the Debtor in the underlying bankruptcy was an entity created by Greg Lindberg, a convicted felon who allegedly used the purchase of the Defendant’s medical practice as part of a wide-ranging scheme to siphon insurance company money for personal benefit. The Court found the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that the transfer was made with the actual intent to defraud creditors, noting the presence of several "badges of fraud" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b), such as the fact that the $25 million purchase price significantly exceeded the value of the practice's assets and that the Debtor was left overleveraged and unable to meet its debt obligations. The Amended Complaint also contained plausible allegations that the Debtor’s transfer to the Defendant connected to and furthered Lindberg’s fraudulent scheme. As a result, the Court found the first and third causes of action stated a claim for actual fraudulent transfer and met the heightened pleading standard for fraud under Rule 9(b).