Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment. After the Defendant failed to respond to the complaint or summons in an adversary proceeding pursuing avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. §548, the Court entered a default judgment. The Plaintiff-Trustee then executed on the judgment, withdrawing $82,261.37 from the Defendant’s bank account in April 2025. The Defendant later filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on July 10, 2025, claiming excusable neglect due to email communication issues with its attorney.
     When seeking “relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b), a moving party must first show (1) that the motion is timely, (2) that he has a meritorious claim or defense, and (3) that the opposing party will not suffer unfair prejudice if the judgment is set aside." United States v. Welsh, 879 F.3d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Park Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1987). After meeting each of the three required threshold conditions, the movant "must then satisfy one or more of the six grounds for relief set forth in Rule 60(b)." Park, 812 F.2d at 896.
     The Court denied the motion, first finding the Defendant failed to meet a threshold requirement for setting aside the default judgment—timeliness. See Welsh, 879 F.3d at 533; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). The Defendant filed the motion more than five months after the default judgment and over two-and-a-half months after the Defendant’s bank account was garnished, with no compelling explanation for the delay.
     The Court further determined that the Defendant did not demonstrate excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). The Fourth Circuit has “established two analytical approaches under Rule 60(b) in cases of default: (1) those that involve a blameless party and a blameworthy attorney, and (2) those that involve a blameworthy party.” Heyman v. M.L. Marketing Co., 116 F.3d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1997). As that court noted, “when dismissal is caused by the negligence of a party, vacatur is not granted as freely.” Id. (citing Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1988)). In this case, the Court was unable to find excusable neglect as the purported lapse in communication stemmed from the Defendant’s failure to inform its attorney that its email address was no longer active, which was firmly in the Defendant’s control. The Court also rejected the alternative argument under Rule 60(b)(6), finding the Defendant made no mention of the extraordinary circumstances that would justify relief under that provision. See Justus v. Clarke, 78 F.4th 97, 110 (4th Cir. 2023).
Because the Defendant did not satisfy the necessary conditions to set aside the default judgment, the Court denied the motion, leaving the judgment in effect.